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China’s National 
 Champions: The 
 Evolution of a National 
Industrial Policy — Or 
a New Era of Economic 
Protectionism?
In this article we ask a series of related research questions concerning China’s recent industrial 
 policies, particularly the 10th and 11th fi ve-year economic policy plans. Our questions go to the 
nature of China’s long-term competitiveness of its national champions, and to what extent Chinese 
government policies are evolving to domestic protectionism that adversely affects foreign invested 
enterprises’ (FIEs) competitive position in the Chinese economy. We thus evaluate the nature of the 
fi ve-year economic policy plans, their adverse impact on FIEs operating in China, and the rise of 
designated Chinese national champions (in the 11th fi ve-year economic policy plan) to compete with 
major FIEs on a global scale. However, we suggest that the role of the Chinese government’s recent 
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industrial policy3 motivations of the Chinese government 
(Roberts, 2010a). Are these recent changes a continuation 
of an evolution in Chinese industrial policy enhancing the 
international competitiveness of China’s national cham-
pions in the longer term? Is this a recent and substantive 
change in a government policy previously encouraging 
FDI (and domestic economic growth) into China? Or 
could this be the culmination of a national industrial pol-
icy that has “nurtured” the development of SOEs since the 
late 1980s, and who represent the Chinese government’s 
anointed national champions? Are the foreign govern-
ment and private sector criticisms of these alleged Chinese 
protectionist policies leading to an adverse change in FIE 
decisions regarding FDI in China? These are not insignifi-
cant questions, as nonfinancial FDI in China has increased 
from $40.7 billion in 2000 to $92.4 billion in 2008, a 127% 
increase in 8 years (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). 
To answer these critical questions, this article first 
explores China’s modern industrial policy, focusing on 
the evolution of its SOE and “national champion” strategy 
A
n increasing concern of foreign governments 
is the emerging pattern of industrial policies 
established by the government of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) (hereafter “China” or “Chinese 
government”) favoring Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) at the expense of their foreign counterparts.1 
According to the US Chamber of Commerce, concerns 
that the Chinese government is retreating on opening 
its economy to foreign direct investment (FDI) are at a 
10-year high among US companies directly investing in 
China (Reuters, 2010).2 For example, results of a recent 
survey undertaken by the American Chamber of Com-
merce in the People’s Republic of China (2011a) reveals 
that US foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) are facing 
product discrimination in SOE purchases and Chinese 
government procurement policies, with 46% of survey 
respondents believing that indigenous innovation prefer-
ences will negatively impact their firms, and 70% rating 
the PRC government’s enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights as either “ineffective” or “totally ineffective.” 
Further, 71% of survey respondents believe that the Chi-
nese government licensing process effectively discrimi-
nates against FIEs (American Chamber of Commerce in 
the People’s Republic of China, 2011a).
In its Business Confidence Survey 2011, the European 
Union Chamber of Commerce (2011b) reports that its 
survey respondents perceive that Chinese government 
industrial policies have become increasingly less fair for 
FIEs over the past two years (43% in 2011 versus 33% in 
2010) and 46% expect this trend to continue, up from 
36% in 2010’s survey. Moreover, European companies 
are being shut out of the bidding process for China’s $1.1 
trillion market for public projects due to opaque bidding 
procedures, inconsistent enforcement of regulations, 
and local content rules (European Union Chamber of 
Commerce, 2011a). In summary, PRC industrial policies, 
including regulations concerning indigenous innovation, 
licensing standards, government procurement, competi-
tion law, and intellectual property enforcement, remain 
significant obstacles for FIEs operating in China (Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of 
China, 2011b; European Union Chamber of Commerce, 
2011c).   
These examples of alleged domestic “new protec-
tionism” initiatives raise basic questions concerning the 
industrial policy, when compared to Michael Porter’s “Diamond of National Competitive Advantage” 
recommended government policy approaches, may not augur well in the long-term for China’s 
national champions. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
PRC industrial policies, 
including regulations con-
cerning indigenous innova-
tion, licensing standards, 
government procurement, 
competition law, and intel-
lectual property enforce-
ment, remain significant 
obstacles for FIEs operating 
in China.
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phase reforms (instituted within the Chinese Communist 
Party’s series of Five-Year Plans) included decollectiviza-
tion and the “household responsibility system” in the 
agriculture sector, and the institution of a dual-price 
system that developed product markets outside the state 
planned economic system (Brandt & Rawski, 2008; Hay, 
Morris, Liu, & Yao, 1994). This policy allowed for the sale 
of products above the state quota among state-owned 
industries located in urban areas (Brandt & Rawski, 2008; 
Hay et al., 1994). Furthermore, China opened to FDI in 
1980, in four special economic zones, for the first time in 
30 years (Brandt & Rawski, 2008; Ng & Tuan, 2001). To 
complement the country’s welcoming FDI, the Chinese 
constitution—as early as 1982—has protected the legal 
rights of FIEs (Havrylchyk & Poncer, 2007).
In the second phase of economic reforms under 
Deng Xiaoping (from the mid-1980s through the mid-
1990s), private enterprise controls by the central govern-
ment continued to decline (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). 
Furthermore, there was simultaneous development of 
product and factor markets, as well as efforts at small-
scale privatization of SOEs, resulting in a more diversi-
fied equity ownership structure in the Chinese industrial 
sector (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). During this phase of 
economic reform, the Chinese government drove the 
development of product standards for a variety of elec-
tronic products, including consumer video discs, digital 
televisions, integrated circuits, and cellular telephony 
(Linden, 2004). According to Liu & Garino (2001), in 
1997, wholly controlled SOEs accounted for 44% of total 
industrial sales, collectively owned firms accounted for 
(often at the expense of private Chinese companies and 
FIEs4) (Browne & Dean, 2010). Second, this article iden-
tifies recent trends in protectionist Chinese government 
policies, including competition and national economic 
security policies, domestic indigenous and procurement 
policies, foreign investment policies, product standards, 
and patent law. Third, based on the preceding explica-
tion of Chinese industrial policy, this article evaluates 
whether these policies are a change in the direction of 
national industrial policy, or the natural evolution of 
this national industrial policy, while applying Porter’s 
(1990a) “Diamond” framework to Chinese industrial 
policy, specifically to Chinese national champions firms 
and their future international competitiveness. Fourth, 
this article concludes with a discussion of the questions 
raised above, first focusing on recent Chinese industrial 
policies and how they translate to long-term, interna-
tional competitiveness of Chinese national champions, 
and second, discussing new directions in foreign govern-
ment trade policies and FIE corporate policies pertaining 
to the future climate for FDI in China.
The Modern Industrial  Policy of China
Modern Chinese industrial policy has evolved through 
four phases of economic reform over the past three 
decades (see Figure 1). The beginning of modern indus-
trial policy in China dates to December 1978, when Com-
munist Party reformer Deng Xiaoping and his allies began 
the first phase of a series of economic reforms continuing 
into the early 1980s (Brandt & Rawski, 2008). These first 
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the progressive opening of its domestic market to foreign 
competition in future years (Henley, Kirk & Wilde, 1999; 
Poon, 2009; World Trade Organization, 2001). In 2003, 
central government ownership rights and direct control in 
196 major state enterprise groups were vested in a newly 
formed Beijing-based state agency (with branch offices 
throughout the country), the Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) (Kroeber, 2006). 
SASAC also has regulatory authority over SOEs at the 
provincial and lower levels, but it does not exercise direct 
ownership rights (Kroeber, 2006).
The Chinese government has chosen its “pillar” or 
“strategic” industries based on the following four policy 
criteria: defense and national security, job creation, tech-
nology and skill acquisition, and competitive advantage. 
According to Haley (2009), the Chinese government 
chose “pillar” or “strategic” industries (with several indus-
tries falling under more than one criterion) in its 10th 
(2001–2005) and 11th (2006–2010) five-year economic 
policy plans (see Table 1).
Beginning in 2005, the fourth phase of economic 
reform began under the most recent Wen administration, 
whereby SOE privatization efforts halted and government 
subsidies for remaining SOEs (“national champions”) 
were increased (Scissors, 2009). The Wen administration 
is enhancing the economic power and opportunities of 
their national champions in strategic industries (Wines, 
2010). Moreover, the increase in government investment, 
that is, standard subsidies as well as subsidies in support 
of brand equity or specific product brands, is focused 
to promote the rise of Chinese national champions 
within these strategic sectors to compete with major FIEs 
26% of total industrial sales, mixed state and privately 
owned firms accounted for 24% of total industrial sales, 
and wholly privately owned firms contributed 6% of total 
industrial sales. Increasingly, there was decentralization 
of national control over the provinces, leading to the 
development of village-level private enterprise (Brandt & 
Rawski, 2008).
 Beginning in the late 1990s, the third phase of eco-
nomic reforms began under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, 
with large-scale privatization of SOEs occurring and sev-
eral major monopolies being liquidated and their assets 
sold to private investors. This third phase of economic 
reform was designed to create a diversified ownership 
structure in the industrial sector of the Chinese economy, 
with the national government retaining state ownership 
in strategic sectors of heavy industry, while simultaneously 
withdrawing ownership control of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Lin, 2001). Furthermore, in the late 1990s 
China’s government officially promulgated its policy to 
foster “national champions and independent core tech-
nologies” that eventually gave rise to “pillar” or “strategic” 
industries that would remain “under absolute state control 
or kept within strong state influence” in the twenty-first 
century (Poon, 2009). As a result of Chinese industrial 
policy strategy, between 2001 and 2004 the number of 
SOEs decreased by 48%, although SOEs still accounted 
for about 40% of industrial value added to the national 
gross domestic product (Brandt & Rawski, 2008).5 Also, 
on November 10, 2001, China received approval as a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), thus 
insuring an evolving WTO influenced national industrial 
policy toward attracting FDI growth when anticipating 
TABLE 1 Pillar Industries by Chinese Governmental Criteria
Defense and National Security Job Creation
Aerospace
Semiconductor Design and Manufacture
Computer Hardware




Semiconductor Design and Manufacture
Iron and Steel Manufacture
Machinery and Mechanical Equipment
Information Technology
Technology and Skill Acquisitions Competitive Advantage
Biotechnology




Telecommunications and Telecommunications Equipment
Logistics, Shipping, and Storage
Banking and Insurance
Strategic Brand Equity
Machinery and Mechanical Equipment
Wholesaling and Retailing
Utilities and Power Equipment
Source: Haley (2009).
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a Chinese national champion often rested “solely” on 
the ability of an FIE to provide proprietary technology 
transfer—patents and trade secrets related to production 
methods—and upgrades to that technology to a potential 
future Chinese competitor (Prestowitz, 2009). According 
to Poon (2009, p. 6):
These “national champions” act as vehicles with which 
to accumulate independent productive and technologi-
cal capabilities in strengthening inter-linkages within 
the domestic economy and propelling the country up 
the economic value chain. While the end-results remain 
to be seen, this represents the next key stage of China’s 
ongoing reform experience that is ultimately aimed at 
“catching-up” to the technological frontier in laying the 
foundations for future growth and the attainment of 
a higher-wage society comparable to that of advanced 
industrialized economies.
On March 14, 2011, China’s National People’s Con-
gress approved the nation’s 12th Five-Year Plan for 
national economic development through 2015, which 
also brought an end to the “super national treatment” 
that foreign MNEs enjoyed for 30 years under the six pre-
vious Five-Year Plans (China Business Focus, 2011; KPMG 
China, 2011). The 12th Five-Year Plan is expected to 
continue the major economic policy shift undertaken by 
the 11th Five-Year Plan, which moved away from a focus 
of “growth at any cost” toward a balanced and sustainable 
growth pattern (APCO Worldwide, 2010). According to 
Fung and Peng (2012, pp. 1–2):
At the Plan’s core lies: the question of how to main-
tain momentum towards rapid economic growth built 
up during the past 30 years of “Reform and Opening 
Up”; how to greatly enhance the competency of Chi-
nese enterprises, transforming them from followers 
into leaders on the global stage, and drivers of global 
growth; and how to adjust the economic model to cope 
with these social, economic, technical and environmen-
tal factors that hamper development.
In the 12th Five-Year Plan, three industrial sectors are 
singled out, with seven designated as “Strategic Emerging 
Industries”: energy (new energy, including nuclear, wind, 
and solar power; energy conservation and environmen-
tal protection; and clean energy vehicles); health care 
(drugs and medical devices); and technology (new mate-
rials, including rare earths and high-end semi-conduc-
tors; new information technology, including broadband 
networks, Internet security infrastructure, and network 
convergence; and high-end equipment manufacturing, 
including aerospace and telecommunication equipment 
( Scissors, 2009). These strategic industries were targeted 
and nurtured by the Chinese government not because 
they necessarily complemented the country’s compara-
tive advantage, but because they could potentially provide 
positive externalities in education, science, technology, 
or national security (Prestowitz, 2009).
The 11th Five-Year Plan stressed an FDI policy that 
moved away from the “growth-at-all costs” economic 
development approach and emphasized a “quality of FDI 
approach” that entailed promoting foreign investments 
that introduce advanced technology or have significant 
research and development (R&D) components (Poon, 
2009). The Chinese government offered special subsidies 
for FIEs to invest in China in certain strategic industries, 
including automotive, telecommunications equipment, 
biotechnology, information technology, and semicon-
ductor design and manufacture—but with certain quid 
pro quo requirements (Haley, 2009).6 While the Chinese 
government had a policy of introducing FDI as a build-
ing block of its economic development, FDI by FIEs in 
some strategic industries required these companies to 
enter into joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers 
(Prestowitz, 2009). Approval for a joint venture with 
Approval for a joint ven-
ture with a Chinese national 
champion often rested 
“solely” on the ability of an 
FIE to provide proprietary 
technology transfer—patents 
and trade secrets related to 
production methods—and 
upgrades to that technology 
to a potential future Chinese 
competitor.
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competition with FIEs within China, are contributing 
to an environment that is increasingly perceived as less 
open to FDI (Browne & Dean, 2010; American Chamber 
of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, 2011b; 
European Union Chamber of Commerce, 2011b). As the 
European Union Chamber of Commerce has noted, FIEs 
“are losing market share in China across a broad range 
of industries because of discriminatory treatment by the 
government and regulators” (Anderlini, 2010). Given this 
growing consensus on trends in Chinese industrial policy 
toward FDI, what subsequently follows are the six substan-
tive government policy areas that have been interpreted 
by many executives as discouraging for their future invest-
ment in the PRC, and one substantive government policy 
encouraging FDI in China.
Competition and National Economic Security Reviews
Under the recently enacted Antimonopoly Law of 2008, 
the Antimonopoly Law Enforcement Authority (ALEA), 
an agency of the Ministry of Finance and Commerce 
(MOFCOM), is charged with reviewing and ruling on 
whether proposed cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) will concentrate economic power and result in 
restricting or eliminating market competition in the PRC 
(Ross, 2008). Contrarily, the ALEA may rule not to pro-
hibit the industry concentration if those parties involved 
in the merger or acquisition can prove either that the 
positive effect of the concentration or competition out-
weighs the negative effects, or that the concentration is 
in the “public interest,” a line of reasoning that has not 
yet been clearly defined and is potentially problematic 
for FDI (Wang & Zhang, 2009). The Antimonopoly 
Law contains language indicating that the M&A review 
process “will include protection of existing competitors 
and the effect on the national economy in addition to 
the effect on competition as such” (Ross, 2008, p. 67). 
Thus, the Antimonopoly Law not only “aims to protect 
both ‘fair market competition’, but the ‘socialist market 
economy’” (Orey, 2009, p. 73). Under Article 27 of the 
Antimonopoly Law, one factor that ALEA considers in 
its merger and acquisition review process is “the effect of 
the concentration on national economic development” 
(Ross, 2008, p. 66). In addition to the Antimonopoly Law, 
Article 12 of the Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors requires for-
eign investors to report to MOFCOM any transactions in 
which they will acquire control of domestic entities in key 
economic sectors and/or affect national economic secu-
rity or famous Chinese brands (Evrard, Harris, Wang, & 
Zhang, 2010). Although the antitrust merger review chap-
ter of these Rules is understood to have been superseded 
(APCO Worldwide, 2010; KPMG China, 2011). Moreover, 
as Li & Woetzel (2011, p. 2) argue in their analysis:
The central government could further shape the com-
petitive landscape by specifically identifying technology 
paths, industry standards, market entry criteria, and 
partnership models. Given the fragmented markets that 
developed around early favorites such as wind and solar 
power, the government will increasingly become selec-
tive in its policies, looking for avenues to expedite con-
solidation and to identify national champions quickly. 
To summarize China’s modern industrial policy, Lin 
& Wang (2008) identified economic reforms as initially 
adopting a “micro-first” approach, whereby the transition 
to a market economy began with the promulgation of 
incentive structures at the firm/household level, that is, 
agricultural decollectivization, establishment of special 
economic zones, enterprise autonomy in the state sector, 
and promotion of non-state enterprises facing budget 
constraints. This economic strategy was followed later by 
“macro-level” policies, that is, liberalization of the com-
modity price system, fiscal reforms, and setting a competi-
tive exchange rate, and the continued use of dual-track 
economic strategies, whereby the traditional central 
planning system remained intact, while market opening 
changes were made on the margin over time, including 
ownership diversification and the targeting of strategic 
industries and subsequent nurturing of national champi-
ons (Lin & Wang, 2008). Lin and Wang (2008) propose 
that this gradual approach to economic reform, or indus-
trial policy, follows a “logic of learning and innovation to 
explore its comparative advantage” (which, according to 
the authors, has been “only partially successful”) while 
simultaneously emerging as a global manufacturing cen-
ter. In conclusion, Ravallion (2008, p. 17) observes that: 
“[C]hina’s success was not just a matter of letting markets 
do their work. That success would not have been possible 
without strong state institutions implementing supportive 
policies and public investments.”
Recent Trends in China’s Industrial 
Policy
The year 2010 was a turning point for what many foreign 
executives and government officials view as the “new pro-
tectionism” of China’s national champions in the nation’s 
fourth phase of economic reform (Roberts, 2010a). As 
national industrial policies are perceived throughout the 
world, China’s is allegedly the one of most concern to 
FIEs (The Economist, 2010). These Chinese government 
economic policies, as well as the intensifying domestic 
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 countries or the fostering of national champions should 
be beyond the scope of antitrust review.
On February 3, 2011, China’s State Council issued 
Circular 6, establishing a national security review scheme 
for the acquisition of a Chinese company by one or 
more non-Chinese investors (Li, Arsenault, & Li, 2011). 
Effective March 6, 2011, Circular 6 adds new barriers 
confronting non-Chinese investors in China and empow-
ers the Chinese government to review certain types of 
transactions for which investors have not traditionally 
sought such approval, including the following unan-
swered questions: What businesses are “key” or affect 
national security? What type of minority investor rights 
constitute control? How will the Joint Review Committee 
weigh different actors in its review? What is the extent to 
which the security review will lengthen the approval pro-
cess in practice and the likelihood that transactions will 
be blocked or reversed? (Li et al., 2011).
In summary, while the Chinese government has 
made significant progress in clarifying its new compe-
tition law regime, concerns persist—albeit somewhat 
naively—regarding risks attributable to (American Cham-
ber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, 
2011b, p. 40):
… certain provisions of the AML and its implementing 
measures [that] may be applied in a manner contrary 
to the general “antitrust” goals of promoting consumer 
welfare and economic efficiency; and that Chinese 
competition laws may be selectively or discriminatorily 
enforced to promote industrial policy and other ends.
Domestic Innovation and Procurement Policies
Beginning in 2006, the Chinese government formally 
introduced a policy of promoting indigenous innova-
tion through privileged access by Chinese companies 
to the government procurement market (Levy, 2011; 
US-China Business Council, 2010). This policy involved 
government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Com-
merce, working cooperatively within the State Council 
Leading Group on Science, Technology, and Education 
to institute preferential policies, product catalogues, 
financing schemes, and other tools reflecting preference 
in government procurement to ensure the development 
of Chinese-owned technology and IP (US-China Busi-
ness Council, 2010). The primary concern of FIEs was 
that they would be excluded from selling to China’s 
government procurement programs because they have 
developed patents and trademarks in other national 
by the Antimonoploy Law, Article 12 appears to remain 
in force (Evrard, et al., 2010).
On March 18, 2009, the ALEA denied approval 
of Coca-Cola’s planned $2.4 billion acquisition of the 
PRC’s Huiyuan Juice Group, which would have allowed 
Coca-Cola to control less than 20% of the PRC’s juice 
market, a percentage that would hardly be worthy of 
an antitrust review in the U.S. (Orey, 2009). According 
to George L. Paul, an antitrust attorney with White & 
Case, a Washington, D.C., law firm, the PRC’s denial of 
the Coca Cola acquisition “is nothing less than a frontal 
assault on foreign investment disguised as merger review” 
(Orey, 2009, p. 73). According to Wang & Zhang (2009): 
“Indeed, MOFCOM [Ministry of Finance and Com-
merce] expressly cited potential effects on small- and 
medium-sized competing juice companies as one ground 
for its rejection of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan transaction.” 
Wang and Zhang (2009) further elaborate on their 
concerns regarding “murky protectionism” in the PRC’s 
Antimonopoly Law7:
Article 27 [of the Antimonopoly Law] appears to per-
mit consideration of other goals, such as protection of 
domestic competitors or national economic develop-
ment that would be better separated from antitrust 
review. … In addition, the consideration of a proposed 
transaction’s effects (sic) on “market entry and tech-
nological progress” in Article 27 has sparked concerns 
about potentially excessive regulatory discretion, preju-
dice against IP [intellectual property] rights (especially 
when held by Western firms and seen by many in China 
as entry barriers to fair competition) and favoritism 
towards domestic Chinese industry.
Through August 2010, ALEA approved 95% of its 
reviewed merger review applications, a number that 
compares favorably to both the United States and the 
European Union, which both approve 93% uncondition-
ally (King & Wood, 2010). What still remains uncertain, 
however, is whether the ALEA decision to reject Coca-
Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan Juice based on a desire to 
protect so-called iconic Chinese brands, that is, “national 
champions,” will be a precedent for future decisions. 
Also, U.S. companies who are participating in MOFCOM 
review proceedings report (American Chamber of Com-
merce in the People’s Republic of China, 2011b, p. 46):
… a tendency on the part of MOFCOM personnel to 
couch investigations in terms of competitiveness of 
countries or economies rather than undertakings (i.e., 
considering the impact of a concentration on China’s 
competitiveness rather than competition in the rel-
evant market. Such concerns with competition between 
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have a license to use the respective IP (Lubman, 2011). 
After a December 2010 US-China Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade meeting, the Chinese government 
agreed to delink its innovation policies from government 
procurement preferences and made other changes to its 
indigenous innovation policies (United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission, 2011). Furthermore, effective 
July 1, 2011, the Ministry of Finance announced that it 
revoked three national laws linking procurement with 
indigenous innovation: Evaluation Measures on Indig-
enous Innovative Products for Government Procurement; 
Administrative Measures on Budgeting for Government 
Procurement of Indigenous Innovative Products; and 
Administrative Measures on Government Procurement 
Contracts for Indigenous Innovative Products (Layton, 
Liang, & McKonkey, 2011). 
 While reassurances from the PRC government con-
tinue, the European Chamber of Commerce (2011c, 
p. 63) concludes that, “foreign companies are still dis-
criminated against in public procurement in a number 
of concrete ways” and “clarification on the definition 
of ‘domestic products’ and its application is needed.” 
Moreover, this indigenous innovation procurement prob-
lem continues at the provincial and municipal levels of 
Chinese government, as fragmentation of the Chinese 
government procurement market allows for these local 
governments to develop their own written and unwrit-
ten procedures and procurement catalogues (European 
Chamber of Commerce, 2011a). In April 2011, US com-
panies reported that local governments in China had not 
delinked their indigenous innovation procurement poli-
cies to conform to national policies (Bussey, 2011).
Exchange Rate Regime
As of July 2008, in response to the global economic crisis, 
the Chinese government stopped the appreciation of its 
currency, the renminbi or RMB, and returned to a peg 
at approximately 6.83 RMB to the U.S. dollar (“Oanda 
Historical Exchange Rates,” 2010). Since July 2005, the 
RMB began its decline from 8.3 RMB to the U.S. dollar 
(“Oanda Historical Exchange Rates,” 2010). According to 
a recent analysis of the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission (2010, p. 21):
China’s deliberately undervalued RMB has unfairly 
conferred substantial economic advantages on China 
to the detriment of major trading partners, principally 
the United States and Europe. China’s undervalued 
RMB makes China’s exports cheaper and imports more 
expensive, and it encourages foreign direct investment 
into China, resulting in the loss of investment and jobs 
in Europe and the United States.
jurisdictions ( US-China Business Council, 2010). Thus, 
products would be required to have a patent owned by an 
entity in China or their original first registration of trade-
marks in China to be eligible for the government pro-
curement market in China (US-China Business Council, 
2010). The six areas identified for inclusion in the indige-
nous innovation catalog include: information technology 
related; computers; communication, including mobile 
phones; office equipment, including scanners; software; 
new energy equipment; and new energy-efficient prod-
ucts (US-China Business Council, 2010).
Building on published November and December 2009 
Chinese government edicts related to indigenous innova-
tion, in January 2010, the Chinese government released its 
draft administrative rules, Implementing Regulations on the 
Government Procurement Law, stating that qualifying prod-
ucts, including indigenous innovation products, should 
be given priority or mandatory purchase preference (with-
out further clarification), causing concern from FIEs that 
they may be excluded or restricted from procurement par-
ticipation (US-China Business Council, 2010).8 In January 
2010, the Ministry of Science and Technology modified 
this indigenous innovation policy as it pertains to govern-
ment procurement so as to include registered FIEs, so 
long as their products comply with national laws, regula-
tions and “technology” policies, applicant’s own IP rights, 
products are classified as “advanced,” and they must be 
“reliable” in quality (Lubman, 2011). In April 2010, the 
IP requirement was modified so that FIEs must only 
The primary concern of 
FIEs was that they would 
be excluded from selling to 
China’s government pro-
curement programs because 
they have developed patents 
and trademarks in other 
national jurisdictions.
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Council, 2010). Foreign investment is limited to minority 
ownership (or face other ownership prohibitions) in the 
agricultural, automobile, chemicals, machinery, paper, 
securities, shipbuilding, steel, and telecommunications 
industries, among others (Frisbie, 2010; Poon, 2009).11 In 
April 2011, the National Development and Reform Com-
mission and MOFCOM released a draft of the Catalogue 
for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry 2011 (hereafter 
Draft Catalogue). In this new Draft Catalogue, there are 
new “encouraged” and “permitted” sectors for FDI. It is 
unclear, however, whether limitations to foreign share-
holding remains, for instance, in new energy automobile 
components and parts, as well as medical instruments 
(European Union Chamber of Commerce, 2011c).
Another contentious issue related to foreign invest-
ment in China is direct offsets.12 An example of such 
direct offset requirements includes the General Electric 
Company having to agree to share its technology with two 
Chinese companies as a requirement of being awarded 
a $900 million contract for high-technology electricity-
generation turbines (Kranhold, 2004). Furthermore, the 
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
(2005, p. 30) notes that “… Chinese firms have used their 
leverage to extract offsets—agreements to transfer some 
of the aircraft production along with the related expertise 
and technology—as part of the deals.” 
This Chinese government pressure for the transfer 
of knowledge of cutting-edge technology in high value-
added industries is found, for example, in the nuclear 
industry, where Westinghouse released more than 75,000 
technical documents to its Chinese customers as required 
in an agreement to license reactor technology (Roberts, 
2010b), and the passenger rail industry, where Kawasaki, 
who entered into a joint venture with Chinese manu-
facturer CSR, soon found its patented, high-speed train 
technology imitated by its Chinese partner (Shirouzu, 
2010). China has also issued new rules for the electric 
vehicle market, with foreign automobile companies indi-
cating that in order to participate in this industry sector, 
they would be forced to share electric vehicle propri-
etary technology with Chinese competitors (Shepardson, 
2010). This direct offset requirement policy continues 
because the Chinese government did not sign a key 
piece of the WTO accession agreement that would pro-
hibit this required sharing of proprietary technology, 
or a requirement that foreign manufacturers establish 
research centers to train Chinese engineers in the pro-
prietary technology, from being demanded by the PRC 
government (Kranhold, 2004).
Another regulatory barrier to FDI involves business 
licensing requirements. While 71% of U.S. company 
C. Fred Bergsten (2010), president of the Peterson 
Institute of International Economics, describes RMB 
undervaluation in very specific terms:
Such currency manipulation is a blatant form of protec-
tionism. It subsidizes all Chinese exports 25 to 40 per-
cent. It places the equivalent of a 25 to 40 percent tariff 
on all Chinese imports, sharply discouraging purchase 
from other countries.9
The Chinese government, however, strongly denies 
that its exchange rate policies are being manipulated to 
encourage domestic exports, and consequently contribut-
ing to the continued trade imbalances with its trade part-
ners in the U.S. and Europe (Batson, Johnson, & Browne, 
2010). To date, less than .01% of China’s international 
trade is conducted in its own currency (Cookson, 2010). 
What China does aspire to is transforming the RMB into 
an international, or at least regional, reserve currency in 
the long-term, thus allowing the country to conduct trade 
and settle accounts in its own currency (US-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, 2010). To attain 
this currency goal, the People’s Bank of China in June 
2010 announced that it was in the process of slowly intro-
ducing policy changes and currency reforms by allowing 
the RMB steady appreciation against the dollar through 
“a managed floating exchange rate regime” tied to a 
basket of currencies (Freeman & Yuan, 2011; US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010).10  In 
a July 2011 report, the staff of the International Monetary 
Fund argued that “the renminbi remains substantially 
below the level consistent with medium-term fundamen-
tals” and that “despite the important progress made in 
many policy areas, the real effective exchange rate has 
depreciated over the past year” (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011, p. 18).
Foreign Investment Restrictions, Barriers, 
and Disincentives
In addition to the review of M&As found in a clause 
in the Antimonopoly Law, over the past five years the 
Chinese government has initiated a litany of official sec-
toral industrial policies that increasingly restrict foreign 
ownership and access in the Chinese market, reflecting 
a formal shift towards a more selective treatment of 
FDI unevenly applied across industrial sectors (Frisbie, 
2010; Poon, 2009).  In April 2010, the Chinese State 
Council released new regulations on FDI, welcoming 
foreign investment in high-tech industries, the service 
sector, and energy savings and environmental protection, 
strictly prohibiting FDI in polluting and energy-intensive 
projects or industries running at overcapacity (State 
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tion on dividends greatly increasing foreign investors’ 
global tax liability. Third, to qualify for the EIT tax rate, 
“high technology enterprises must possess a number of 
qualifying requirements.”13 These qualifying requirements, 
particularly one requiring possession of core intellectual 
property, have been interpreted as being designed to 
pressure, if not force, increased technology transfer of key 
technologies and knowledge to Chinese competitors.
Global Product Standards
The lack of harmonization of international and Chinese 
technical standards remains a serious concern for FIEs in 
China (American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011b). In the 2005 National Standard-
ization Strategy, the China National Institute of Standard-
ization and the Standardization Administration of China 
officially called for the nation to move from a net importer 
and consumer of international technical standards to that 
of a producer of national and global standards by 2020 
(Zhao & Graham, 2006). There is increasing concern that 
the Chinese government often uses mandatory technical 
standards as part of its industrial policy to promote the 
growth of its domestic companies and limit the access of 
FIEs to the Chinese market (Roberts, 2010a; American 
Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, 
2011b).14 An example of this abuse of technical standards 
(and apparent violation of WTO policy) was the proposed 
mandatory data-encryption standard for wireless local area 
networks, known as the Wireless LAN Authentication Pri-
vacy Infrastructure, announced in mid-2003 that proved 
incompatible with internationally recognized wireless local 
area networks (WLAN) standards (Roberts, 2010a; Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of 
China, 2004). According to Kogan (2005, p. 7):
Apparently, this requirement [WLAN standards] was 
imposed for the purpose of differentiating and pro-
tecting the nascent marketplace for Chinese tech-
nologies and products from more advanced and 
encroaching U.S. technologies and products. It also 
likely serves as a disguised means of extracting sensi-
tive proprietary information (trade secrets) and other 
intellectual property from U.S. technology companies 
without adequate compensation or IP protections for 
competitive advantage.
The apparent abuse of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, which only allows for manda-
tory domestic standards related to the protection of the 
public welfare (“environment, health, and safety”), was 
recognized in the American Chamber of Commerce in 
the People’s Republic of China (2004) 2004 membership 
respondents recently surveyed believe that the licensing 
process is not the same for foreign and Chinese compa-
nies (American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011a), this has been a particularly 
vexing issue for insurance companies and foreign banks. 
For example, insurance companies such as Chubb, Lib-
erty Mutual, and Zurich are only allowed to apply to open 
one branch at a time, and it typically takes more than 18 
months to win approval (Roberts, 2010a). The end result 
of this business licensing policy is that many insurance 
companies have no more than a handful of branches in 
operation (Roberts, 2010a).  For foreign bank branches 
licensed to conduct business in all currencies for both 
corporate and personal clients, regulations issued by the 
People’s Bank of China (and effective February 2002) 
require operating capital of $67.5 million, while a domes-
tic bank branch with the same business scope required 
only $40.5 million in operating capital (Poon, 2009).
Finally, a general disincentive to foreign investment 
is the Unified Enterprise Income Tax Law, which became 
effective on January 1, 2008, and sets Enterprise Income 
Tax (EIT) rates as follows: unified EIT rate at 25%; small 
business rate at 25%; incentive rate (applicable to high 
technology and environmental enterprises) at 15% (Poon, 
2009). This new EIT tax takes a tougher stance toward FDI. 
First, firms are divided into either tax resident enterprises 
or nontax resident enterprises, with the former category 
taxed on a worldwide income basis, and the latter taxed 
only on China-sourced income, which is often less. Second, 
outbound China-sourced passive income (e.g., dividends, 
royalties, interest) will be subject to a withholding tax rate 
of 10%, with the removal of this withholding tax exemp-
Insurance companies such 
as Chubb, Liberty Mutual, 
and Zurich are only allowed 
to apply to open one branch 
at a time, and it typically 
takes more than 18 months 
to win approval.
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for monetary rewards and damages to employees) is 
another Third Amendment issue that troubles many FIEs 
with R&D activities in China (Wu, 2010). This is due to 
the uncertainty over potential financial, legal, and social 
risks associated with these Final Rules that could lead 
to FIEs moving R&D from China or replacing Chinese 
nationals with researchers from other countries, thus 
reducing presently perceived corporate risk (Wu, 2010).
Finally, due to a lack of transparency and clarity in 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law regarding the use of patents 
as an anti-competitive business practice, there is a per-
ceived lack of distinction between legitimate and abusive 
exercise of IPR under Article 55. This deficiency in a 
clear legal definition of what constitutes anticompetitive 
use of patents is causing US companies concern that it 
could lead to findings that force foreign IP holders to 
license their IP to domestic competitors, or charge royal-
ties less than their commercial value (American Chamber 
of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, 2011b). 
Next, based on the preceding review of Chinese 
industrial policy, we will evaluate, by employing Porter’s 
“Diamond of National Competitive Advantage” frame-
work (Porter, 1990a), whether these policies are a change 
in the direction of national industrial policy or the natu-
ral evolution of long-term national industrial policy.
Government and National Firm 
 Competit ive Advantage: An 
 Application of Porter’s Diamond
Michael Porter (1990a) conducted an international study 
of 10 nations (and utilized 100 case studies) to develop 
an analytic framework combining theories from interna-
tional economics with those from competitive strategy 
that would explain why a specific nation succeeds in par-
ticular industries but not in others. To that end, Porter 
identified four broad attributes that both individually and 
as a system constitute the “Diamond of National Competi-
tive Advantage” (hereafter “Diamond”) (see Figure 2), 
the competitive environment that each nation establishes 
and operates for its industries/firms. These four attri-
butes include:
• Factor conditions: The nation’s position in factors of 
production, such as skilled labor or infrastructure, 
necessary to compete in a given industry.
• Demand conditions: The nature of home-market 
demand for the industry’s product or service.
• Related and supporting industries. The presence or 
absence in the nation of supplier industries and other 
related industries that are internationally competitive.
questionnaire. In this survey, 25% of respondents (and 
50% of representatives of high-technology companies) 
indicated that their Chinese operations had been nega-
tively impacted by new technical standards and certifica-
tion processes (American Chamber of Commerce in the 
People’s Republic of China, 2004). Other recent exam-
ples illustrate this ongoing issue. For example, several 
Italian gas cooking stove manufacturers were “shut out” of 
the Chinese market due to a standards clause that burners 
must withstand temperatures above 700ºC — higher than 
generally accepted global standards (the melting point of 
aluminum is 660ºC) — and requiring that burners cannot 
be made of aluminum (the material commonly used by 
European manufacturers) (Roberts, 2010a).
Patent Law Amendments
On October 1, 2009, the Third Amendment of the Chi-
nese Patent Law (“Third Amendment” hereafter) went 
into effect, with final rules published by the country’s 
State Council on January 19, 2010 (Wu, 2010). While 
the Third Amendment is recognized by many observ-
ers as encouraging innovation in China and adding 
increased protection for innovations created by cross-
border research efforts (Cass, 2010), it has created new 
issues of concern for foreign FIEs. A major issue has to 
do with the compulsory licensing of a patented invention 
if the Chinese government finds that the patent holder 
has not commercially exploited the patent sufficiently, 
or if the patent itself is deemed to restrict competition 
(Cass, 2010). Compulsory licensing provisions often will 
frustrate intellectual property incentives for innovation 
by maintaining inventions in secrecy (Intellectual Prop-
erty Owners Association, 2009). Under the Third Amend-
ment, says Cass (2010), “compulsory licensing decisions 
turn on opaque standards such as ‘sufficient’ use of 
patents and ‘proper justification’ for patent holders’ 
decisions.” Unless the State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO) issues clarifying rules for implementing this vague 
legislation, FIE patent holders will be at constant risk of a 
compulsory license requirement (Cass, 2010).
Another issue for FIEs to consider under the Third 
Amendment is foreign license filing requirements for 
patent applications based on inventions “completed” in 
China. Thus, in managing research and development 
(R&D) in China, FIEs (with research occurring in differ-
ent countries on the same invention) are confronted with 
the onerous SIPO requirements making it problematic on 
where they should file their first patent application (Wu, 
2010).15 Finally, the ambiguity of the Final Rules (inter-
preting the Third Amendment legislation) concerning 
the topic of inventor remuneration requirements (both 
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As part of his “Diamond” framework, Porter (1990b, 
p. 86) envisions the proper role of government
… as a catalyst and challenger; it is to encourage – or 
even push – companies to raise their aspirations and 
move to higher levels of competitive performance, even 
though this process may be inherently unpleasant and 
difficult. Government plays a role that is inherently 
partial, that succeeds only when working in tandem 
with favorable underlying conditions in the diamond. 
Still, government’s role of transmitting and amplifying 
the forces of the diamond is a powerful one. Govern-
ment policies that succeed are those that create an 
environment in which companies can gain competitive 
advantage rather than those that involve government 
directly in the process, except in nations early in the 
development process.17 It is an indirect, rather than a 
direct, role.
To this end, Porter (1990b, pp. 87–89) identifies 
some basic policy approaches that governments should 
embrace to play an important supporting role for the 
international competitiveness of national firms:
• Focus on advanced, specialized factor creation. These 
include specialized apprenticeship programs, univer-
sity-industry research collaborations, industry asso-
ciation activities, and most importantly, company 
investments that ultimately create the factors that will 
yield competitive advantage.
• Avoid intervening in factor and currency markets. Govern-
ments should not pursue policies that intentionally 
drive up factor costs or the exchange rate. Rather, 
when market forces create rising factor costs or a 
higher exchange rate, the government should resist 
the temptation to push them back down.
• Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. The conditions in the 
nation governing how companies are created, orga-
nized, and managed, as well as the nature of domestic 
rivalry.
Porter (1990b) makes two distinctions in the fac-
tors of production: those that are basic and those that 
are advanced. He believes that basic and generalized 
factors are inherited or relatively easy to create or repli-
cate. Advanced or specialized factors—those specialized 
to a particular industry’s needs—are viewed as a more 
decisive and sustainable basis for competitive advantage. 
Demand conditions necessary for national competitive 
advantage to a nation include the composition, size, and 
pattern of growth; the existence of internationally com-
petitive related and supporting industries; the strategies 
and structures of firms as well as the nature of domestic 
rivalry; and the intensity of domestic rivalry in particular, 
as it encourages firms to upgrade their technologies and 
human capital. It is the systemic nature of this complex 
“Diamond” framework that makes it difficult to replicate 
the exact structure of an industry in another country. Por-
ter (1990b) also recognizes the indirect role of “chance” 
events, which by definition is beyond the control of firms, 
but often creates forces that reshape the industry struc-
ture, resulting in a firm’s competitive position. Further-
more, Porter (1990b) views the role of government in the 
competitive development of an industry as an important, 
but indirect role, mainly through influencing (“transmit-
ting and amplifying”) the four major determinants of 
competitive advantage.16 This role of government in the 
national competitive advantage of a nation is that which 
will be compared to the recent evolution in China’s 
industrial policy.













It is the systemic nature of 
this complex “Diamond” 
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exact structure of an indus-
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strategic trade theory when evaluating country economic 
performance.  According to Smit (2010, p. 123):
At most, it [Porter’s “Diamond”] is a useful framework 
that provides management with a tool to identify coun-
try sources of competitive advantage that firms can 
leverage to enhance their internationally competitive 
positions. It can therefore not be used as a framework 
to devise trade policy with a view to enhancing the inter-
national competitiveness of a country.
By competitiveness, then, it “is meant the ability, 
under present conditions, of a country’s producers 
[firms] to command world markets” (Adams, Gangnes, & 
Shachmurove, 2006: 103).
Given this analytic limitation of Porter’s Diamond 
framework, that is, with a focus on the firm, the role of 
the Chinese government’s recent industrial policy will be 
compared to Porter’s recommended policy approaches, 
and the results will be subsequently evaluated for their 
long-term impact on Chinese national champions’ inter-
nationally competitive positions.
Government Intervention in Currency Markets
Porter strongly recommends that national governments 
not actively intervene to keep their country’s currency 
exchange rate low. It is alleged that the Chinese govern-
ment began actively manipulating its currency, the RMB, 
in 2005, with the RMB estimated to be undervalued 
between 25 and 40%. While its’ undervalued currency 
results in cheaper Chinese exports, and encourages FDI 
in China, in the longer term this monetary policy threat-
ens trade policy retaliation from aggrieved nations. This 
trade policy retaliation can potentially stifle FDI, and 
the technology and knowledge transfers to higher-value, 
emerging industries, such as wind turbines in the clean 
energy sector, where existing Chinese technology lags 
behind that found abroad (Roberts, 2010a).
Product Standards as Barriers to Domestic Entry
Porter views the development of leading-edge product 
standards domestically as contributing to such national 
product standards being commercially accepted on a 
global basis. Chinese national industrial policy, opera-
tionalized in government-mandated technical standards, 
is increasingly being used to protect its domestic compa-
nies from foreign competitors, including their indigenous 
Chinese operations. The perception of many FIEs is that 
the Chinese government is abusing the WTO’s Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade, which only allows 
for mandatory technical domestic standards related to 
the protection of public welfare (i.e., environment, 
• Enforce strict product, safety, and environmental stan-
dards. Stringent standards for product performance, 
product safety, and environmental impact pressure 
companies to improve quality, upgrade technology, 
and provide features that respond to consumer and 
social demands. When tough regulations anticipate 
standards that will spread internationally, they give 
a nation a head start in developing products and 
services that will be valuable elsewhere in the global 
economy.
• Sharply limit direct cooperation among industry. Coop-
erative research should be only indirect, channeled 
through independent organizations to which most 
industry participants have access. The most useful 
cooperative projects often involve fields that touch 
a number of industries and that require substantial 
R&D investments.
• Promote goals that lead to sustainable investment. Govern-
ments should encourage sustained investment in 
human skills, in innovation, and in physical assets. A 
key tool for raising the rate of sustained investment is 
a tax incentive for long-term capital gains incentives to 
new investment in corporate equity.
• Deregulate competition. Regulation of competition 
through the maintenance of state monopolies, con-
trolling entry into an industry, or fixing prices results 
in reduced rivalry and innovation, as management 
focuses on dealing with regulators and protecting 
present market position. Furthermore, it makes the 
industry less dynamic and a less desirable buyer or 
supplier.
• Enforce strong domestic antitrust policies. Real national 
competitiveness requires governments to disallow 
mergers, acquisitions, and alliances that involve indus-
try leaders. Furthermore, the same standards for 
mergers and alliances should apply to both domestic 
and foreign companies, and governments should 
favor internal entry over acquisition (unless it is small 
companies in related industries where there is a trans-
fer of skills that could create competitive advantage).
• Reject managed trade: Rather than promoting innova-
tion in a nation’s industries, managed trade guaran-
tees a market for inefficient companies. Government 
trade policy should pursue open market access in 
every foreign nation. Where government finds a trade 
barrier in another nation, it should concentrate its 
remedies on dismantling barriers, not on regulating 
imports or exports.
As Smit (2010) notes, Porter’s Diamond framework 
does not replace the theory of comparative advantage or 
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and innovative, critical components for a successful 
global champion.
Restrictive Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition Reviews
As noted, the recently enacted Antimonopoly Law con-
tains language indicating that the M&A review process 
include protection of existing competitors and the effect 
on the national economy. Furthermore, under Article 27 
of the Antimonopoly Law, one factor that the Antimo-
nopoly Law Enforcement Authority (ALEA) considers in 
its merger and acquisition review process is the impact of 
the industry concentration on China’s economic develop-
ment. In addition to the Antimonopoly Law, Article 12 of 
the Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enter-
prises by Foreign Investors requires foreign investors to 
report to the government any transactions in which they 
will acquire control of domestic entities in key economic 
sectors, adversely affect national economic security, or 
a famous Chinese brand. What still remains uncertain, 
however, is whether the ALEA decision to reject Coca-
Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan Juice is based on a political 
desire to protect so-called iconic Chinese brands (i.e., 
“national champions”) and will be a precedent for future 
merger and acquisition decisions. Contrary to the Chi-
nese competition laws and policy, Porter recommends 
that identical standards for M&As be applied to both 
domestic and FIEs to nurture real national competitive-
ness for designated national champion firms planning to 
become global competitors.
Discriminatory Patent Law Requirements
Under the recent Third Amendment of the Chinese Pat-
ent Law, a major issue confronting FIEs is the compulsory 
licensing of a patented invention if the Chinese govern-
ment finds that the patent holder has not commercially 
exploited the patent sufficiently, or if the patent itself is 
deemed to restrict competition. Unless the SIPO issues 
clarifying rules for implementing this legislation, FIE 
patent holders will be at constant risk of a compulsory 
license requirement. Another issue for FIEs to consider 
under the Third Amendment is foreign license filing 
requirements for patent applications based on inventions 
“completed” in China. Thus, in managing R&D business 
activities in China, FIEs (with research occurring in dif-
ferent countries on the same invention) are confronted 
with the SIPO requirements—making it problematic 
on where they should file their first patent application. 
Porter would consider such trade barriers as contrary 
to promoting indigenous innovation among Chinese 
national champions, leading to long-term inefficiencies 
in the domestic marketplace and negatively impacting 
health, and safety). This form of domestic protection-
ism does not lead to the long-term acceptance of such a 
commercially incompatible mandated technical standard 
(and product), such as the WLAN standard, in the global 
marketplace (Kogan, 2005).
Sustainable Investment: Innovation through Preferential 
Procurement Policies
Since 2009, the Chinese government has been promoting 
domestic industrial innovation through priority or man-
datory state procurement preferences for Chinese-owned 
companies covering six high-technology product catego-
ries: information technology related; computers; com-
munication, including mobile phones; office equipment, 
including scanners; software; new energy equipment; 
and new energy efficient products.18 These procurement 
preferences were ostensibly established to help develop 
Chinese-owned technology and IP and may provide ini-
tial markets for Chinese national champions, but they 
also risk long-term consequences in that they deter FIEs 
from investing, or otherwise limiting their investment, 
in China. Such FDI consequences of these preferential 
procurement policies, especially if enforced by provincial 
and municipal governments, may include withholding 
access to important IP and state-of-the-art knowledge of 
process innovations from potential joint ventures with 
Chinese technology-based enterprises.
Controlling Foreign Entry into Domestic Industries
Over the past five years, the Chinese government has 
initiated a series of official industrial policies that increas-
ingly restrict FDI in a wide range of industries that are 
populated by national champions.  Foreign investment 
is limited to minority ownership (or other ownership 
prohibitions) in the agricultural, automobile, chemicals, 
machinery, paper, securities, shipbuilding, steel, and 
telecommunications industries, among others. Another 
contentious issue related to FDI is direct offsets, whereby 
agreements to transfer some of the production along with 
the related expertise and technology are required of for-
eign suppliers to Chinese companies. Another regulatory 
barrier to FDI involves business licensing requirements, 
particularly as it applies to insurance companies (e.g., 
limits on the number of branch operations) and foreign 
banks (e.g., minimum capital requirements). Finally, a 
general disincentive to foreign investment in China is 
the Unified Enterprise Income Tax Law, which became 
effective on January 1, 2008, and takes a tougher stance 
toward encouraging FDI. Porter views the controlling of 
entry into domestic industries as inhibiting rivalry and 
competition, as well as making the industry less dynamic 
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government policymakers in choosing the “pillar” or 
“strategic” industries in its 10th and 11th five-year eco-
nomic policy plans has been crucial in the develop-
ment of targeted government economic policies adversely 
impacting FIEs. Within strategic industries, the Wen 
administration’s 11th and 12th five-year economic policy 
plans further refine its economic policies, ranging from 
M&A restrictions in competition policy to indigenous 
innovation procurement policies to foreign direct invest-
ment restrictions. These policies promote the rise of 
designated Chinese national champions (within these 
strategic sectors) to ultimately compete with major FIEs 
on a global scale. Contrary to what many foreign govern-
ment officials and MNE executives believe are recent, 
aberrant protectionist economic policy changes insti-
gated by the Chinese government, the empirical policy 
evidence supports the position that China’s recent trends 
in protectionist domestic policies are carefully planned 
and integral to the nation’s long-term industrial policy. 
Indeed, in a January 2010 letter addressed to senior US 
government officials, including the U.S. secretary of 
state and the US trade representative, the heads of 19 
US business and industry associations warned against the 
“[s]ystematic efforts by China to develop policies that 
build their domestic enterprises at the expense of U.S. 
firms and U.S. intellectual property ...” (Information 
Technology Industry Council, 2010).19 This recognition of 
the latest phase of an evolving industrial policy designed 
to build national champions, however, is generalizable to 
any foreign firm, or its IP, presently operating in China.
The role of the Chinese government’s recent indus-
trial policy, as compared to Porter’s recommended gov-
ernment policy approaches, may not augur as well in 
the long-term for China’s national champions. First, the 
Chinese government has been actively manipulating its 
currency, the RMB, estimated to be undervalued between 
25% and 40%, thus risking trade policy retaliation and the 
stifling of FDI (and the technology and knowledge trans-
fers to emerging Chinese industries). Second, while Porter 
views the development of leading-edge product standards 
domestically as contributing to national product stan-
dards being commercially accepted on a global basis, Chi-
nese government-mandated technical standards continue 
to be used for protection of domestic companies from for-
eign competition. Third, government procurement poli-
cies have been established to help develop Chinese-owned 
technology and IP and may provide initial markets for 
Chinese national champions, but they also risk deterring 
or limiting FIEs from investing in China, thus withhold-
ing access to important IP and process innovations from 
joint ventures with Chinese technology-based enterprises. 
Chinese company competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace.
Discussion
In the introduction of this article, a series of related 
research questions are posed addressing China’s recent 
industrial policy, particularly as it addresses the nation’s 
most recent 10th, 11th, and 12th (2001–2005, 2006–2010, 
and 2011–2015) five-year economic policy plans. These 
questions include: 
• Are these recent public policies a continuation of 
an evolution in Chinese industrial policy planned to 
enhance the international competitiveness of China’s 
national champions in the long-term? 
• Is this a recent and substantive change in a govern-
ment policy previously encouraging FDI (and domes-
tic economic growth) into China? 
• Or could this be the culmination of a national indus-
trial policy that has “nurtured” the development of 
SOEs since the late 1980s, who represent the Chinese 
government’s anointed national champions? 
• Are the foreign government and private sector criti-
cisms of these alleged Chinese protectionist policies 
leading to an adverse change in FIE decisions regard-
ing FDI in China?
These questions go to the nature of China’s long-
term competitiveness of its national champions, and to 
what extent that Chinese government policies are evolv-
ing to domestic protectionism that adversely affects FIEs’ 
competitive position in the Chinese economy.
In evaluating the long-term competitiveness of Chi-
na’s national champions, the explicit nature of  Chinese 
Unless the SIPO issues clar-
ifying rules for implementing 
this legislation, FIE patent 
holders will be at constant 
risk of a compulsory license 
requirement.
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 mentioned earlier, FDI into China increased by 127% 
over the first eight years of this past decade, but one has 
to wonder whether that figure could have been higher. 
Moreover, in the past couple of years, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s policy of “squeezing” FIEs for access to pat-
ented technologies and trade secret process innovations, 
in return for their companies’ product access to domestic 
markets, has intensified. Those FIEs who have entered 
into joint ventures with Chinese national champions 
have often found that transferring their technology and 
knowledge of their manufacturing process to their Chi-
nese partners may have opened the door to these com-
panies attempting to compete in the global marketplace 
on lower prices for a nearly identical, high-value-added, 
technology-based product.
On the surface, this may appear to be naiveté on the 
part of foreign executives; however, it is not. The lure 
of gaining access to the growing Chinese marketplace 
is allowing the Chinese government to negotiate this 
technology and knowledge transfer with FIEs. There is 
a dichotomy to these policies in that, on the one hand, 
market access is being granted by certain government 
agencies to FIEs wishing to operate in China; however, 
on the other hand, other Chinese government agen-
cies are instituting new regulations and policies that are 
Fourth, the Chinese government has initiated industrial 
policies that increasingly restrict FDI in a wide range of 
industries populated by national champions, a policy 
that Porter views as inhibiting rivalry and competition, as 
well as making the industry less dynamic and innovative, 
critical components for a successful global champion. We 
also argue that these indigenous innovation policies may 
fall under red or yellow light subsidies, thereby distort-
ing competition and violating provisions of the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement (see articles 3–7). Fifth, contrary to 
both the Antimonopoly Law and Rules on Mergers and 
Acquisitions, Porter recommends that identical standards 
for evaluating M&As be applied to both domestic and 
FIEs, perquisites to nurture the level of competitiveness 
for designated national champion firms to become global 
competitors. Finally, under the recent Third Amendment 
of the Chinese Patent Law, a major issue confronting 
FIEs is the compulsory licensing of a patented invention 
under certain commercial circumstances, a policy that 
Porter would consider contrary to promoting indigenous 
innovation among Chinese national champions, leading 
to long-term inefficiencies in the domestic marketplace, 
and negatively impacting company competitive advantage 
in the global marketplace.
Chinese industrial policy is not based in certain 
fundamental attributes of Porter’s Diamond, specifically 
the often limited home-market demand for a strategic 
industry’s products or services, and the lack of intensity 
of domestic rivalry, in particular, as an intense domestic 
market rivalry drives firms to continually innovate. In the 
case of China, the designation of “national champions” is 
established through centralized Chinese government five-
year economic plans, and not by Chinese national cham-
pions emerging through intense competition and rivalry 
in the domestic market. The development of national 
champions is thus built primarily upon an export market. 
This is contrary to the successful industrial policy model 
for another Asian economic power, Japan, which has 
developed a large number of internationally competitive 
firms in different high value-added industries, including 
automotive, construction equipment, consumer electron-
ics, machine tools, shipbuilding, and steel manufactur-
ing, all the result of intense competition in the Japanese 
home market, with the “winners” becoming globally com-
petitive MNEs (Porter, 1990a).
The recent evolution in Chinese industrial policy, 
notably since China became a member of the WTO and 
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao acquired 
power in 2002 (as well as tracking the last two five-year 
economic plans), have left MNEs less positive on China 
as a home for foreign investment (Roberts, 2010a). As 
In the case of China, the 
designation of “national 
champions” is established 
through centralized Chi-
nese government five-year 
economic plans, and not by 
Chinese national champions 
emerging through intense 
competition and rivalry in 
the domestic market.
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 restricting market access. Moreover, many individual 
FIE executives are reluctant to publicly criticize such dis-
criminatory regulations or policies out of fear of angering 
the Chinese government, or in the case of legal action 
(e.g., for patent infringement), refrain from legal action 
“because they believe the justice system favors domestic 
enterprises” (Roberts, 2010a, p. 36). As one foreign FIE 
attorney stated: “The Chinese are very good at smashing 
the nail that sticks up” (Roberts, 2010a, p. 36). In conclu-
sion, it appears that the seduction of access to the Chinese 
marketplace continues to drive many FIE executives to be 
negotiated out of their technology, trade secrets, and IP, 
while not adequately factoring into their decision-making 
calculus the potential long-term, competitive threats from 
Chinese national champions to their own high value-
added products in the global marketplace.
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Notes
1. Eden & Lenway (2001) point out the “Janus face” of globalization 
(and MNEs): On the one hand, MNEs are recognized as important 
agents of change for globalization, instigating the “creative destruction” 
that diffuse new, socially beneficial technologies throughout the world 
economy. On the other hand, while MNEs have goals directed to profit 
maximization, nation-states have broader goals focused on job creation, 
tax revenue generation, economic development, and maintaining a 
high (and increasing) standard of living for its citizenry.
2. The volume of FDI inflows into China has been spectacular, totaling 
$488 billion (over the period 1988 to 2003), with 271,963 MNEs operat-
ing in-country (Tang, Selvanathan, & Selvanathan, 2008).
3. There are many definitions of industrial policy. A broad definition of 
industrial policy focuses on the public programs and private-sector insti-
tutional relationships that impact a country’s economic development 
and international competitiveness (Lehne, 2001). A narrow definition 
of industrial policy (and one adopted by the authors in this article) has 
a national government initiating public policies aimed at improving a 
country’s economy through their impact on specific industrial sectors 
(i.e., by choosing “national champions”). According to Noland & Pack 
(2003, p. 10) specific examples of industrial policy instruments include: 
“credit directed at specific sectors with below-market interest rates for 
long-term and working capital, sectorally differentiated profit taxes, 
subsidized electricity rates, research and development subsidies, control 
of the entry and exit of firms, export targets, and highly differentiated 
tariffs and nontariff barriers.”
4. Huang (2008), in his study, argues that the urban biased government 
policies initiated in the early 1990s have skewed the Chinese economy 
and significantly hindered stable private sector growth. Huang (2008) 
is highly critical of the popular view that China’s economy has become 
increasingly receptive to private enterprise over the 30 years of the 
reform period, instead suggesting a contrarian view of a resurgent state 
sector sidelining the vibrant, sustainable, and equitable economic devel-
opment characteristic of China in the early to middle 1980s.
5. According to data compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2007), the number of SOEs declined to 24,961 by 2006.
6. Certain of these subsidies may be in violation of WTO policies.
7. Wang & Zhang (2009) question the efficacy of the new Antimo-
nopoly Law cross-border M&A review process: “The review process 
in MOFCOM is not transparent, so it is not clear how MOFCOM will 
substantially review any particular transaction and what legal principles, 
arguments and analytical methods MOFCOM will consider, including 
how economic analysis and data enter into the analysis.”
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8. On December 10, 2009, trade associations from Canada, Europe 
Japan, South Korea, and the United States asked the Chinese min-
istries responsible for issuing the November document related to 
procurement of indigenous innovation-related products to delay 
implementation of the administrative rules laid out in the circulars 
and engage with representatives of industry on how to advance China’s 
science and technology goals and promote innovation through a fair 
and transparent selection process (The US-China Business Council, 
2010).
9. There is a question as to what type of export subsidy the current 
currency manipulation may fall under. As a rule of thumb, the WTO 
categorizes subsidies into three distinct groupings: green light, yellow 
light, and red light subsidies. These provisions established in the Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter SCM 
Agreement) (World Trade Organization, 1995) are commonly referred 
to as the “Traffic Light” subsidies categories. Green light subsidies are 
allowed by the WTO and are typically neutral and provide objective 
support to home country industries often with built-in “sunset provi-
sions” (Folsom, Gordon, & Spanogle, 2002). Green light subsidies may 
include research and development subsidies, regional subsidies, and 
environmental subsidies (Folsom et al., 2002). Red light subsidies are 
actionable before the WTO due to their being “de facto” export and 
import subsidies (World Trade Organization, 1995). Yellow light sub-
sidies fall somewhere in-between green light and red light subsidies. 
These subsidies are not insulated from dispute and are actionable 
before the WTO if they cause injury to an industry in another country 
(World Trade Organization, 1995). Furthermore, “[m]ost subsidies fall 
within the actionable category. In a dispute over an actionable subsidy, 
a challenge has to prove that the subsidy does one of three things: that 
it causes harm to the domestic industry; that it impairs or nullifies the 
benefits derived from its WTO membership, such as when a subsidy 
deprives a member of market access because its goods are priced out 
of the market; or that it causes ‘serious prejudice’ to the member. Seri-
ous prejudice can be claimed if a domestic producer or producers are 
negatively affected by the subsidy in the subsidizing country or in other 
countries, for example, when they lose market share” (Global Subsidies 
Initiative, 2010).
10. On June 19, 2010, China’s central bank issued a brief statement 
that promised greater flexibility in its currency, although there were 
no specific measures mentioned in this statement (People’s Bank of 
China, 2010).
11. The Chinese government, in its Catalogue Guiding Foreign Invest-
ment in Industry, lists the industrial sectors where FDI is encouraged, 
restricted, or prohibited across the economy (Frisbie, 2010). Under 
the 2012 Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry, released on 
December 24, 2011, and taking effect on January 30, 2012, the National 
Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce 
(2011) have moved alternative energy cars, electrical machinery, Inter-
net equipment and some service industries into the “encouraged” cat-
egory to attract FDI. Specific industrial policies, such as a preferential 
tax structure or streamlined regulatory approval process, are utilized by 
the national and local governments to encourage this type of FDI (Back 
& Galbraith, 2011).
12. According to Herrnstadt (2008, p. 3): “Direct offsets involve technol-
ogy and/or production directly related to the purchased product. For 
example, the production of part of a fighter jet is transferred to another 
country in return for that country purchasing the fighter jet.”
13. These qualifying requirements include the following: (1) possess 
independent ownership of core intellectual property rights; (2) provide 
products and/or services within high-technology areas encouraged by 
the government; (3) have incurred R&D expenses exceeding the mini-
mum required percentage of annual sales revenue; (4) have income 
from high- or new technology products and/or services exceeding the 
required percentage of total revenue; (5) have a number of R&D per-
sonnel exceeding the required percentage of total employees; (6) meet 
other specified requirements (Poon, 2009).
14. The Chinese government annually issues over 10,000 new techni-
cal standards governing a variety of industries – more than the rest of 
the world combined (Roberts, 2010a). As part of China’s World Trade 
Organization agreement they pledged to adopt 2,000 international 
standards per year within the first five years (Weeks & Chen, 2003). 
The Standards Administration of China issued a much awaited 2010 
National Standards-Setting and Revision Plan that outlines standards 
set (1,195 items) and standards revised in 2010 (1,101 items) (American 
Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China, 2011b). In 
a survey conducted by the United States International Trade Commis-
sion (2011), US intellectual property–intensive firms identified “China-
specific technical standards” as one of two top policy areas as current 
problems.
15. Also, as Gupta and Wang (2011) note: “In many other cases, a Chi-
nese filer ‘patents’ a foreign invention in China with the goal of suing 
the foreign inventor for ‘infringement’ in a Chinese legal system that 
doesn’t recognize foreign patents.”
16. Porter’s (1990a) indirect, supportive role of government in his 
research study has received criticism from Stopford & Strange (1991), 
and Van den Bosch and De Man (1994). Davies and Ellis (2000, p. 
1189) summarize what they view as Porter’s “failings” in his research 
study: “Sustained prosperity may be achieved without a nation becom-
ing ‘innovation-driven,’ ‘strong diamonds’ are not in place in the home 
bases of many internationally successful industries and inward foreign 
direct investment does not indicate a lack of ‘competitiveness’ or low 
national productivity.”
17. The PRC became the world’s second largest economy in the world, 
as second quarter 2010 gross domestic product rose to $1.335 trillion for 
China, as compared to $1.286 trillion for Japan (which previously held 
this position since 1968) (Hosaka, 2010). According to Hosaka (2010), 
after three decades of rapid industrialization, China no longer qualifies 
as a nation that is “early in the development process.”
18. Such government procurement policies are not technically in viola-
tion of WTO rules, since the Chinese government has not yet signed 
onto the agreement covering government procurement (although the 
Chinese government plans on signing the agreement—with a requested 
phase-in period of 15 years) (Roberts, 2010a).
19. Economic sanctions imposed against China for both geopolitical 
and economic competitiveness reasons by the U.S. government date 
back to the Korean War. Yang, Askari, Forrer, & Teegen (2004, p. 
1048) classify these sanctions in three major categories: (1) US laws 
and regulations that apply to China but are not exclusive to China; (2) 
multilateral sanctions that the U.S. leads or participates in that apply 
to China but are not exclusive to China; and (3) US sanctions imposed 
specifically on China, although such sanctions may not necessarily be 
unique for China.
References
Adams, F. G., Gangnes, B., & Shachmurove, Y. (2006). Why is China so 
competitive? Measuring and explaining China’s competitiveness. World 
Economy, 27(7), 1047–1081.
American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China 
(2004). Standards (White Paper). Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China 
(2011a, March 22). Business confidence survey. Beijing, People’s 
Republic of China.
American Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China 
(2011b, May 26). State of American business in China (White Paper). 
Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
Anderlini, J. (2010, September 2). Foreign companies “losing out” in 
China. Retrieved September 29, 2010, from www.ft.com/cms/s/ ae64093e-
b677-11df-86ca-00144feabdc0, dwp_uuid=  9c33700c-44feabdc0.html
APCO Worldwide (2010, December 10). China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. 
Retrieved July 25, 2011, from www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/
chinas_12th_five-year_plan.pdf
Back, A., & Galbraith, A. (2011, December 31/January 1). China down-
shifts on autos, boosts energy in foreign investment review. Wall Street 
Journal, p. B3.
Batson, A., Johnson, I., & Browne, A. (2010, March 15). China talks 
tough to U.S. currency. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved November 17, 
2010, from http:online.wsj.com/article/SB1424052748703457104575 
121213043099350.html
China’s National  Champions: The  Evolution of a National Industrial Policy — Or a New Era of Economic Protectionism?  211
DOI: 10.1002/tie Thunderbird International Business Review  Vol. 55, No. 2  March/April 2013
Bergsten, C. F. (2010). Beijing is key to creating more U.S. jobs. Foreign 
Policy, 14. Retrieved November 17, 2010, from www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2010/04/14/china_the_job_killer
Brandt, L., & Rawski, T. G. (2008). China’s great economic transfor-
mation. In L. Brandt & T. G. Rawski (Eds.), China’s great economic 
transformation (pp. 1–26). New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press.
Browne, A., & Dean, J. (2010, March 17). Business sours on China. Wall -
 Street Journal. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from http://online.wsj.com/
article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB100014240527487046886045_7512565035
29668686.html
Bussey, J. (2011, April 18). U.S. technology firms, China tangle 
again over contracts. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved January 1, 2012, 
from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000014240527_4870454760 
4576263060096988604.html
Cass, R. A. (2010, February 10). Patent reform with Chinese character-
istics. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved November 3, 2010, from http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB123419814824764201.html
China Business Focus. (2011, May). 12th Five-Year Plan means new 
chances for foreign investors. Retrieved July 24, 2011, from http://
en.cbf.net.au/Item/2736.aspx
Cookson, R. (2010, August 26). Banks back switch to renminbi for trade. 
Financial Times. Retrieved November 18, 2010, from www.ft.com/CMS/
s/0/182a2b70-b130-11df=b899-00144feabdc0.html/#axzz15gMp4CWn
Davies, H., & Ellis, P. (2000). Porter’s competitive advantage of nations: 
Time for the final judgment? Journal of Management Studies, 37, 
1189–1213.
The Economist. (2010, August 5). Picking winners, saving los-
ers. Retrieved September 25, 2010, from www.economist.com/ 
node/16741043/print
Economist Intelligence Unit. (2007). China. Country profile. London, 
England: Author.
Eden, L., & Lenway, S. (2001). Introduction to the symposium, Mul-
tinationals: The Janus face of globalization. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 32(3), 383–400.
European Union Chamber of Commerce. (2011a, April 20). European 
business: Experiences competing for public contracts. Beijing, People’s 
Republic of China.
European Union Chamber of Commerce. (2011b, May 26). Business 
confidence survey 2011. Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
European Union Chamber of Commerce. (2011c, September 8). Euro-
pean business in China 2011/12 (Position paper). Beijing, People’s 
Republic of China.
Evrard, S., Harris, H. S., Wang, P. J., & Zhang, Y. (2010, March 29). 
China plans national security review of foreign investments. Jones Day. 
Retrieved July 27, 2010, from www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert-china-
plans-national-security-review-of-foreign-investments-03-29-2010/
Folsom, R. H., Gordon, M. W., & Spanogle, J. A. (Eds.). (2002). Interna-
tional business transactions: A problem oriented coursebook. St. Paul, 
MN: West Group.
Freeman, C. W., & Yuan, W. J. (2011, June). China’s exchange rate poli-
tics: Decoding the cleavage between the Chinese ministry of commerce 
and the people’s bank of China. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
& International Studies.
Frisbie, J. (2010, June 16). An assessment of China’s trade and industrial 
policies—and how to address them. Testimony before the U.S. House 
Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, DC.
Fung, E., & Peng, Y. (2012, February). Forces driving China’s economic 
growth in 2012: New thoughts, new strategies, new initiatives. KPMG 
Advisory (China) Limited. Retrieved May 7, 2012, from www.kpmg.
com/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/ Documents/ 
China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-China-Economic-Growth-201203-2.pdf
Global Subsidies Initiative (2010). The WTO and subsidies. Retrieved 
November 25, 2010, from www.global subsidies.org/en/media-portal/
the-wto-and-subsidies
Gupta, A. K., & Wang, H. (2011, July 28). China as an innovation 
center? Not so fast. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved August 1, 2011, 
from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053119035911045764 
69670146238648.html
Haley, G. T. (2009, March 24). Testimony before the US-China eco-
nomic and security review commission. Hearing: China’s industrial 
policy and its impact on US companies, workers and the American 
economy. Washington, DC.
Havrylchyk, O., & Poncer, S. (2007). Foreign direct investment in 
China: Reward or remedy. World Economy, 30(11), 1662–1681.
Hay, D., Morris, D., Liu, G., & Yao, S. (1994). Economic reform and 
Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises, 1980–87. Oxford, 
 England: Clarendon Press.
Henley, J., Kirk, C. C., & Wilde, G. (1999). Foreign direct investment in 
China: Recent trends and current policy issues. World Economy, 22(2), 
223–243.
Herrnstadt, O. E. (2008, April 17). Offsets and the lack of a compre-
hensive US policy: What do the other countries know that we don’t? 
Briefing Paper No. 201, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, DC.
Hosaka, T. A. (2010, August 16). China surpasses Japan as the world’s 
No. 2 economy. Washington Post. Retrieved November 27, 2010, from 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/ 
AR2010081503 697.html
Huang, Y. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: Entrepre-
neurship and the state. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Information Technology Industry Council. (2010, January 26). Letter to 
the Obama administration. Washington, DC. Retrieved November 20, 
2010, from www.itic.org/clientuploads/Association%20Ltr%20to%20
Cabinet%20China%201-26-10%20%20FINAL.pdf
Intellectual Property Owners Association (2009, July 9). “IPO’s Com-
ments on the Supreme People’s Court Judicial Interpretation Concern-
ing the Application of Laws to the Trial of Patent Infringement Disputes” 
to the Intellectual Property Tribunal, The Supreme People’s Court of 
China. Retrieved June 15, 2011, from www.ipo.org/AM/ Template.
cfm?Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=24136.
Intellectual Property Owners Association. (2010, October 10). IPO com-
ments on the third amendment to P.R.C. patent law. Washington, DC.
International Monetary Fund. (2011, July). People’s Republic of 
China: 2011 article IV consultation (IMF Country Report No. 11/192). 
 Washington, DC.
King & Wood (2010, August 13). Second anniversary of China’s anti-




Kogan, L. A. (2005, June 3). Europe, China and the use of standards as 
trade barriers: How should the U.S. respond? Presentation, U.S. House 
of Representatives, Science Committee, Subcommittee on Environ-
ment, Technology, and Standards. Washington, DC.
KPMG China (2011, March). China’s 12th five-year plan: An over-
view. Retrieved July 25, 2011, from http://kpmg.com/CN/en/
IssuesAnd Insights/ArticlesPublications/PublicationSeries/5- year-
plans/ Documets/China-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Overview-201104.pdf
Kranhold, K. (2004, February 26). GE shares generator plans to win 
$900 million deal; gray area in WTO rules. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 
 October 8, 2010, from http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~glee/Spring%204.htm
Kroeber, A. (2006, May). China’s industrial and foreign trade policies: 
What are they and how successful have they been? Retrieved September 
26, 2010, from www.polsci.indiana.edu/china/papers/kroeber.pdf
Layton, W., Liang, B., & McConkey, M. J. (2011, July 18). China 
announces the revocation of three key measures favoring the pro-
curement of ‘indigenous innovation’ products. Mayer Brown LLP, 
Washington, DC. Retrieved May 7, 2012, from www.martindale.com/ 
government-contracts-law/article_Mayer-Brown-LLP_1314800.htm
Lehne, R. (2001). Government and business: American political econ-
omy in comparative perspective. New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press.
Levy, P. L. (2011, March 9). China’s indigenous innovation policy and 
U.S. interests. Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute, Tes-
timony before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcom-
mittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade. Washington, DC.
212  FEATURE ARTICLE
Thunderbird International Business Review  Vol. 55, No. 2  March/April 2013 DOI: 10.1002/tie
Li, C., Arsenault, P.-L., & Li, J. (2011, March 11). China’s national 
security review for inbound acquisitions. Kirklandpen (Private Equity 
Newsletter). Chicago, IL: Kirkland & Ellis L.L.P.
Li, G., & Woetzel, J. (2011, July). What China’s five-year plan means 
for business. McKinsey Quarterly. Retrieved July 25, 2011, from 
www. mckinseyquarterly.com/what_chins_five-year_plan_means_ for-
business_2832
Lin, C. (2001). Corporatisation and corporate governance in China’s 
economic transition. Economics of Planning, 34, 5–35.
Lin, J. V., & Wang, Y. (2008, December). China’s integration with the 
world: Development as a process of learning and industrial upgrad-
ing. Policy Research Working Paper 4799, World Bank, Development 
Economics Vice Presidency & World Bank Institute, Finance & Private 
Sector Development Division, Washington, DC.
Linden, G. (2004). China standard time: A study in strategic industrial 
policy. Business and Politics, 6(3) Article 4 (Online Journal). Retrieved 
December 10, 2010, from www.bepress. com/bap
Liu, G. S., & Garino, G. (2001). Privatisation or competition: A lesson 
learnt from the Chinese enterprise reform. Economics of Planning, 34, 
37–51.
Lubman, S. (2011, July 22). Changes to China’s “indigenous innovation” 
policy: Don’t get too excited. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved  January 
1, 2012, from http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/22/ 
changes-to-chinas-indigenous-innovation-policy-dont-get-too-excited/
National Bureau of Statistics. (2009). China statistical yearbook 2009. 
Beijing, Peoples Republic of China.
National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Com-
merce (2011, December 24). 2012 Foreign investment industrial guid-
ance catalog, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
Ng, L. F. Y., & Tuan, C. 2001. FDI promotion policy in China: Gover-
nance and effectiveness. World Economy, 24(8), 1051–74.
Noland, M., & Pack, H. (2003). Industrial policy in an era of globaliza-
tion: Lessons from Asia. Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics.
Oanda historical exchange rates (FX history: Quality rates from 1990). 
(2010). Retrieved November 17, 2010, from www.oanda.com/currency/
historical-rates
Orey, M. (2009, April 6). M&A: Behind the heat on global deals. Busi-
ness Week, p. 73.
People’s Bank of China (2010, June 19). Further reform the RMB 
exchange rate regime and enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibil-
ity. Retrieved August 24, 2010, from www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.
asp?col=6400&id=1488
Poon, D. (2009, November). China’s evolving industrial policy strate-
gies & instruments: Lessons for development. Trade & Industrial Policy 
Strategies, Working Paper 2-2009, Retrieved September 26, 2010, from 
www.tips.org.za.publication/working-paper-2-2009-chinas- evolving-
industrial-policy-strategies-and-instruments-lesson
Porter, M. (1990a). The competitive advantage of nations. New York, 
NY: Free Press.
Porter, M. (1990b, March–April). The competitive advantage of nations. 
Harvard Business Review, pp. 73–93.
Prestowitz, C. (2009, March 24). Testimony before the U.S.-China 
economic and security review commission. Hearing: China’s industrial 
policy and its impact on U.S. companies, workers and the American 
economy. Washington, DC. 
Ravallion, M. (2008, January). Are there lessons for Africa from 
China’s success against poverty? Policy Research Working Paper 4463, 
World Bank, Development Research Group, Office of the Director. 
 Washington, DC. 
Reuters (2010. May 24). Concern over China protectionism at 10 Yr 
high–US Chamber. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from www.reuters.com/
assets/print?aid=USTOE64N02F20100524
Roberts, D. (2010a, April 5). Closing for business? Bloomberg Business-
Week, pp. 32–37.
Roberts, D. (2010b, December 6). China wants nuclear reactors – fast. 
Bloomberg Business Week, pp. 15–17.
Ross, L. (2008). China’s antimonopoly law. Antitrust, 22(2), 66–72. 
Scissors, R. (2009, May 4). Liberalization in reverse. The Heritage 
Foundation, Washington, D.C. Retrieved September 22, 2010, from 
www. heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2009/05/Liberalization-in-
Reverse
Shepardson, D. (2010, September 22). Dingell asks China not to push 
U.S. carmakers to share electric technology. The Detroit News. Retrieved 
October 8, 2008, from http://detnews.com/article/20100922/Auto01/
9220421&template=printart
Shirouzu, N. (2010, November 18). Train makers rail against China’s 
high-speed designs. Wall Street Journal, p. 1.
Smit, A. J. (2010). The competitive advantage of nations: Is Porter’s 
diamond framework a new theory that explains the international com-
petitiveness of countries? Southern African Business Review, 14(1), 
105–130.
State Council. (2010, April 13). State council’s regulations on further 
improvement on the work of utilising foreign direct investment. Beijing, 
People’s Republic of China. Retrieved April 18, 2011, from www.gov.cn/
zwgk/2010-04/13/content_1579732.htm
Stopford, J. M., & Strange, S. (1991). Rival states, rival firms: Competi-
tion for world market share. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Tang, S., Selvanathan, E. A., & Selvanathan, S. (2008). Foreign direct 
investment, domestic investment and economic growth in China: A time 
series analysis. World Economy, 31(10), 1292–1309.
United States International Trade Commission (2011, May). China: 
Effects of intellectual property infringement and indigenous innovation 
policies on the U.S. economy. Investigation No. 332-519, USITC Publi-
cation 4226. Washington, DC.
US-China Business Council. (2010, January). Issue brief: New devel-
opments in China’s domestic innovation and procurement policies. 
Washington, DC.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2005, Novem-
ber). 2005 report of the U.S-China economic and security commission 
to the US Congress. Washington, DC.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (2010, Novem-
ber). 2010 report of the US-China economic and security commission to 
the US Congress. Washington, DC.
Van den Bosch, F., & De Man, A. (1994). Government’s impact on the 
business environment and strategic management. Journal of General 
Management, 19(3), 50–59.
Wang, P. J., & Zhang, Y. (2009). China: Merger control. Asia Pacific Anti-
trust Review (Global Competition Review: The International Journal of 
Competition Policy and Review). Retrieved July 3. 2010, from http://
globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/16/sections/59/ chapters/619/
china-merger-control/
Weeks, A., & Chen, D. (2003, May–June). Navigating China’s stan-
dards regime. China Business Review, (Online Journal). Retrieved 
October 4, 2010, from www.chinabusinessreview com/public/0305/
weeks.html
Wines, M. (2010, August 29). China fortifies state business to fuel growth. 
New York Times. Retrieved September 25, 2010, from www.nytimes.
com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
World Trade Organization. (1995). Agreement on subsidies and coun-
tervailing measures. Geneva, Switzerland.
World Trade Organization. (2001, November 10). WTO ministe-
rial conference approves China’s accession (Press Release). Geneva, 
 Switzerland.
Wu, X. (2010, January 27). Impact of recent Chinese patent law 
amendments. Ropes & Gray LLP, Law.360, New York, NY: Portfolio 
Media. Retrieved November 3, 2010, from www.ropes gray.com/files/ 
Publication/.../Article-Wu_Law360360.pdf
Yang, J., Askari, H., Forrer J., & Teegen, H. (2004). US economic 
sanctions against China: Who gets hurt? World Economy, 27(7), 
1047–1081.
Zhao, C., & Graham, J. M. (2006). The PRC’s evolving standards system: 
Institutions and strategy. Asia Policy, 2, 63–87. 
